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This paper exploits the transitions between tax-financed 
health care and social health insurance in the OECD 
countries over the period 1960–2006 to assess the effects 
of adopting social health insurance over tax finance on 
per capita health spending, amenable mortality, and 
labor market outcomes. The paper uses regression-
based generalizations of difference-in-differences and 
instrumental variables to address the possible endogeneity 
of a country’s health system. It finds that adopting social 
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health insurance in preference to tax financing increases 
per capita health spending by 3–4 percent, reduces the 
formal sector share of employment by 8–10 percent, 
and reduces total employment by as much as 6 percent. 
For the most part, social health insurance adoption has 
no significant impact on amenable mortality, but for 
one cause—breast cancer among women—social health 
insurance systems perform significantly worse, with 5-6 
percent more potential years of life lost.  
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1.  Introduction 
The developed and developing world is currently the midst of a lively debate about the 
relative merits of social health insurance (SHI) and tax-financed health systems.
1 Skeptics of 
SHI argue that SHI discourages firms from hiring workers, and hence reduces employment and 
encourages informal labor markets. They also point to lack of coverage among certain groups 
during the often long period between establishing SHI and achieving universal coverage, and 
systematic variations in benefit packages and quality of care across subpopulations. By contrast, 
SHI advocates argue that it can provide an important additional source of revenue for the health 
system, and that by separating the purchasing of health care from its provision and encouraging 
selective contracting between providers (including private sector ones), SHI systems are able to 
achieve better quality health care at a lower cost than tax-financed health systems.  
Like many intriguing and important debates, this one is being conducted on a flimsy 
evidence base.
2 The most basic question—still only partially answered—is how, on average, SHI 
and tax-financed systems perform in terms of key health sector and labor market outcomes. Of 
course, no two SHI systems are exactly alike, and no two tax-financed systems are alike; indeed, 
the health systems in one camp are increasingly borrowing ideas from the other. Nonetheless, 
each system still has certain hallmarks, and trying to establish the system-wide (i.e. aggregate) 
                                                 
1 In Latin America, arguably the two biggest concerns have been closing gaps in coverage and the impact of SHI on 
the labor market (cf. e.g. Baeza and Packard 2006). These concerns have been evident too in the German reform 
debate (cf. e.g. Busse and Riesberg 2004; Schmidt 2006). In 1999, France eliminated the linkage between coverage 
and contributions, and made a commitment to universal coverage for all residents; at the same time, it widened its 
SHI tax base from earnings to include nonwage income. In Africa and Asia, several developing countries are in the 
process of trying to extend and deepen SHI coverage, or are thinking of introducing SHI. Arguably the biggest 
concern in these countries has been and continues to be extending coverage beyond the formal sector (cf. e.g. Hsiao 
and Shaw 2007).  
2 See Wagstaff (2007) for a review of issues and the evidence to date.    3
impacts of choosing one system over another is a useful exercise. Such impacts are unlikely, 
however, to be accurately estimated simply by comparing countries that finance their health care 
through SHI with countries that do so through general revenues, the reason being that whether a 
country has a SHI system or a tax-financed system in place is likely to be endogenous—
unobservable factors correlated with the outcome of interest are also likely to be correlated with 
the choice of system.
3 Two recent papers by Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra (2008a; 2008b) 
(hereafter WMS) attempt to get round this problem by focusing on changes in the way countries 
finance their health care. If the problematic unobservable variables are time-invariant, or if the 
unobservables of the SHI and tax-financed countries follow a parallel trend, a simple-
differences-in-differences regression will reveal the effect of having one system in place (say, 
SHI) rather than the other. WMS test the parallel trend assumption (PTA) against two alternative 
specifications: one where the unobservables follow a country-specific linear trend, the other 
where they follow a system-specific trend that is not necessarily linear. They also test whether 
these three specifications properly account for the potential reverse causality, and estimate the 
impacts of SHI via instrumental variables (IV) where they do not.  
This paper employs the same methods as WMS but on a (mostly) different group of 
countries, namely those in the OECD, and over a longer time period, namely 1960-2006.
4 
Between 1967 and 1986, no fewer than 10 OECD countries abandoned SHI in favor of the tax-
financed NHS-type model. By contrast, in the 1990s, all four of the OECD’s new central 
European countries abandoned the tax-financed Semashko model in favor of SHI. The OECD 
countries provide a potentially important learning experience for other countries: it was in 
                                                 
3 Van der Zee and Kroneman (2007), for example, compare mean outcomes between SHI and tax-financed OECD 
countries at different points in time. Implausibly, the authors’ conclusions are made on the basis of simple 
comparisons of means. No attempt is made to control for confounders, whether observed or unobserved.  
4 WMS focused on the countries of central and east Europe, and central Asia, and covered the period 1990-2004.    4
Germany and neighboring countries that SHI began, and where arguably it has become most 
sophisticated; and it was in the UK and Scandinavia where the tax-financed Beveridge NHS 
model emerged and has developed most. By contrast, the countries examined by WMS—namely 
those in Central and Eastern Europe, and Central Asia—contain SHI countries that are still 
making adjustments to their new systems as well as tax-financed countries that have often 
struggled with the transition to a market economy following the breakup of the former Soviet 
Union. One might argue that the higher health spending but similar health outcomes associated 
with SHI unearthed by WMS could be due to a combination of immaturity on the part of the 
region’s new SHI systems and fiscal stress among the region’s tax-financed systems.  
The present paper differs from the two aforementioned studies in another respect, namely 
that in its analysis of the impacts of SHI on health outcomes the present paper restricts its 
attention to causes of death (and age groups) identified by Nolte and McKee (2008) as amenable 
to medical care, i.e. causes where timely and effective medical care can result in a death being 
avoided. WMS looked at many more causes of death than are included in the present paper, of 
which five are among the 33 considered to be amenable to medical care; however, for three of 
the five causes of death, they used the standardized death rate, which reflects deaths among 
people aged 75 and over among whom deaths are less easily avoided. So, in addition to focusing 
on more mature SHI and tax-financed health systems, this paper focuses on causes of death that 
ought to be amenable both to medical care and to changes in health financing and delivery 
arrangements. If SHI systems do leave some groups uncovered or covered less well than others, 
this ought to get reflected in higher death rates from causes amenable to medical care. If SHI 
systems are better funded, or if they are more efficient in the purchasing and provision of health 
care, this too ought to get reflected in amenable mortality data.    5
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section   2 provides a brief history of health 
system reforms in the OECD countries, and discusses the ways that choice of one system over 
another might affect health spending, health status, and labor market outcomes. Section   3 
presents a brief summary of the methods used, section   4 the data, and section   5 the empirical 
results. Section   6 presents the paper’s conclusions.  
2.  OECD health systems, and health sector and labor market outcomes  
The OECD countries—with the exception of the United States, which relies largely on 
private insurance and out-of-pocket payments, and is excluded from the analysis in this paper—
rely largely on general revenues or SHI to finance health care. This section provides a brief 
review of the transitions from and to SHI, and speculates on the possible impacts on the 
outcomes analyzed in the empirical analysis. These include: per capita national health spending; 
amenable mortality; employment; and the formal-sector share of total employment. Too few 
years’ worth of data on measures of health system throughput—inpatient admissions, length of 
stay, etc.—are available to allow these to be analyzed, or variables building on these (such as 
cost per inpatient admission).  
2.1   Transitions to and from SHI  
In terms of health financing, the (now) 29 OECD countries (excluding the United States) 
fall into four groups (cf. Figure 1).
5 Group (i) comprises countries that have maintained a SHI 
system since the early 1960s: this group includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Turkey. Except in Mexico and 
                                                 
5 This section relies heavily on the Health Systems in Transition (HiT) series, downloadable from 
http://www.euro.who.int/observatory/Hits/TopPage, and Saltman and Dubois (2004).     6
Turkey, SHI contributions account for the vast majority of health revenues in this group of 
countries, and the vast majority of the population is covered by SHI. In Mexico and Turkey, out-
of-pocket payments and taxes finance a sizeable share of health spending. Group (ii) includes 
those who have maintained predominantly tax-financed systems since the 1960s: these countries 
include Australia, Canada, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The 
commitment to tax finance in some countries in this group—notably Australia, Canada, Finland, 
and Sweden—increased in the 1960s and early 1970s, but none of these countries was a SHI 
country at any stage in the period studied. Group (iii) includes those who relied largely on SHI 
contributions but then opted for a universal tax-financed health system at some stage since 1960: 
this group includes Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 
Group (iv) comprises the central European countries that had a SHI system prior to the post-war 
Communist takeover in the late 1940s, operated a tax-financed Semashko system under 
Communism, and then reverted to SHI system in the 1990s: this group includes the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic.  
The fundamental difference between SHI and tax-financed systems is that SHI systems 
raise revenues largely from earnings-related contributions levied largely on formal sector 
workers while tax-financed systems draw their revenues from taxes and nontax government 
revenues. The two systems also differ, however, in their delivery arrangements: traditionally SHI 
systems have been more likely to contract with providers (public and private) rather than operate 
directly-managed facilities (the model many tax-financed systems operate), and as a result the 
provider payment mechanisms in SHI systems tend to be more high-powered than those in tax-
financed systems; furthermore, most tax-financed systems operate a GP gatekeeper system,   7
whereas most SHI systems do not. These differences are likely to have consequences for health 
spending, health outcomes, and employment.  
2.2  SHI vs. tax-finance vis-à-vis health spending  
The collection of earnings-related contributions in SHI systems is typically done within 
the SHI system, while a tax-financed system’s revenues are collected via the tax system. Other 
things equal, this is likely to make a SHI system more costly. These extra costs are often seen as 
a price worth paying by SHI advocates who see earnings-related contributions as more stable and 
more reliable than tax revenues: people may be willing to contribute more if they know their 
contributions are going to provide health insurance coverage for them and other contributors than 
if the monies end up in a large pool of tax revenues whose allocation between the health sectors 
and other sectors is left to the whims of policymakers. In practice, evasion and avoidance of SHI 
contributions is a major issue in many SHI countries, and some ministries of finance reduce the 
tax revenues they assign to the health sector as SHI revenues grow, so SHI revenues are not 
necessarily additional.  
Differences in health spending between the two systems are also likely to reflect 
differences in delivery arrangements. As mentioned, traditionally SHI systems have been more 
likely to contract with providers (public and private) rather than operate directly-managed 
facilities. Again, there are exceptions—some SHI countries (Mexico is an example) rely in part 
or wholly on their own network of directly managed facilities, and there are some tax-financed 
systems that have used or are starting to use a contracting approach—but historically the 
separation of purchasing and provision has been more pronounced in the SHI countries. This 
separation is likely to entail additional costs to the system, especially where there is selective   8
contracting: the costs include the selection of providers, the drawing-up and enforcement of 
contracts, fraud, and so on.  
On the other hand, the purchaser-provider split seen in SHI systems may put downward 
pressure on health spending—a reason why many tax-financed systems have experimented with 
it. Whether it does so in practice is likely to depend in part on the payment methods used. Many 
SHI countries paid providers fee-for-service (FFS), which encourages the provision of services 
on which providers can earn high margins; it is well known to be a payment system that is 
associated with high per capita health spending levels. Only fairly recently have SHI systems 
moved away from FFS and many have yet to do so (Table 1). By contrast, tax-financed systems 
have traditionally (again, there are exceptions) tended to use lower-powered incentives that are 
less likely to lead to high levels of per capita expenditure. Where FFS has been used, it has 
tended to be in the context of paying primary care providers fees to provide specific preventive 
measures, such as immunizations. Only fairly recently have tax-financed systems begun to use 
more high-powered incentives for hospitals, and even here the shift has tended to be toward 
diagnosis-related groups or similar methods rather than toward FFS.  
Another factor affecting whether the purchaser-provider split commonly seen in SHI 
systems puts downward pressure on total health spending is the way the purchaser interacts with 
providers. Surprisingly, perhaps, it was not until fairly recently that SHI systems or tax-financed 
systems began to contract selectively with competing providers. In Belgium, Hungary, and 
Switzerland, sickness funds contract with all health care providers, and in the Czech Republic, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic selective contracting has begun only 
recently. If US evidence is a guide, this might be expected to put downward pressure on costs.   9
However, some tax-financed purchasers have also started to contract selectively, so this may not 
be a factor in understanding any expenditure differences between the two types of system. By 
contrast, SHI systems appear to have more of a tradition of making use of both public and private 
providers, whereas in tax-financed systems it has tended to be at the primary care level that 
private providers have been used. Whether this will work to give SHI systems lower spending is 
unclear.  
A final factor likely to be important in driving spending differences between SHI and tax-
financed systems is the absence of a GP-gatekeeper in a typical SHI system. The Netherlands is 
unusual among SHI systems in having a GP-gatekeeper (some other SHI countries have tried but 
largely failed to introduce it), while Finland and Iceland are unusual among tax-financed systems 
in not having one (Table 1). Countries with GP gatekeepers are known empirically to have lower 
spending per capita (Gerdtham and Jönsson 2000).  
2.3  SHI vs. tax-finance vis-à-vis health outcomes  
On balance, then, it seems plausible a prior that SHI systems will spend more per capita 
on health than tax-financed systems. Insofar as this is true, one might be tempted to conclude that 
SHI systems ought to do better than tax-financed systems in terms of health outcomes. This 
conclusion is not necessarily warranted, however, since the very differences that make SHI 
systems more likely to spend more are also likely to affect the health outcomes they achieve for a 
given level of spending.  
One factor working against SHI systems is that coverage is not necessarily universal in a 
SHI system but is typically so in a tax-financed system. The southern European OECD countries   10
achieved universal coverage only after switching from SHI to tax finance, and many SHI 
systems did not achieve universal coverage until some time after the start of the period under 
study (Korea, for example, achieved universal coverage only in 1989). Some SHI systems in the 
OECD (notably Turkey and Mexico) have yet to achieve universal coverage. It is typically the 
case that the groups not covered by the SHI program—who are often reliant on programs and 
facilities run by the health ministry—will be disadvantaged in terms of resources: in Mexico, for 
example, the health ministry spends less than 50% per capita than the social security institute that 
operates the SHI program (OECD 2005). Moreover, several SHI systems operate (or used to 
operate) multiple SHI schemes alongside one another. In most countries, gaps in benefit 
packages have been reduced if not eliminated, but in some countries they remain: in Austria, for 
example, the highest-spending sickness fund spends 63% more per person than the lowest-
spending sickness fund (Koettl 2008). In countries where SHI schemes compete with one another 
for enrollees usually under a risk-adjusted capitation system (as is currently the case in the Czech 
Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, the Slovak republic, and Switzerland), there is the added 
worry of risk-selection, so that depending on the risk-adjustment formula some groups will prove 
less profitable and may be avoided by insurers and as a result underserved (van de Ven et al. 
2003; van de Ven et al. 2007).  
These gaps and inequalities in coverage in SHI systems are likely to translate into 
inequalities in per capita health spending, which in turn will work to reduce average health below 
what it would have been in the absence of spending inequalities if health spending is subject to 
diminishing returns in the production of health.
6 This ignores, however, the possibility that tax-
                                                 
6 The argument is analogous to Rodgers’s (1979) argument about income inequalities lowering mean health status if 
income is subject to diminishing returns in the production of health.    11
financed systems may also be prone to spending inequalities across the population. While many 
OECD countries now have schemes to steer resources between different areas to reflect 
population numbers (if not population health care needs), these efforts typically date back to the 
late 1970s and early 1980s (the resource-allocation working party (RAWP) formula was 
introduced in England and Wales only in 1977, for example). Today, in fact, it is not clear that 
inequities in health care utilization between the better off and the less well off are any higher in 
the SHI countries in the OECD than in the tax-financed countries (Masseria et al. 2004). This 
may not always have been the case, however.  
Differences between SHI and tax-financed systems in the organization and payment of 
providers are also likely to get reflected in health outcomes for a given level of health spending. 
The aforementioned greater use of the GP gatekeeper model in tax-financed systems seems 
likely to push tax-financed systems toward better health outcomes, since the primary care system 
offers scope for greater use of preventive care, better management of chronic problems, a better 
chance of early detection and treatment of illness, a more coordinated approach to care across 
different providers, and so on. It is also sometimes argued that the more integrated approach to 
provision in a tax-financed system offers a better chance of a close relationship between the 
public health system and the provision of personal health care—a theme that is returned to in the 
conclusions.  
The greater use of contracting providers in SHI systems is also likely to get reflected in 
health outcomes for a given level of spending. The traditional payment methods of a tax-
financed system and its traditionally heavy emphasis on a directly-managed provider network 
may work well to contain overall spending levels, but do little to encourage higher volumes of   12
care (Ellis and Miller 2008); SHI’s traditional emphasis on FFS is likely to do better in this 
regard. Having insurers contract among competing providers might also be expected to 
encourage lower costs if the US experience is anything to go by (cf. e.g. Bodenheimer 2005) but 
as mentioned above, this has only recently started in the OECD’s SHI countries, and has also 
started in some tax-financed systems too. In any case, extra volumes of care may not necessarily 
translate automatically into better health outcomes if the measures that produce the extra volume 
of care—the payment method, or the selective contracting—adversely affects the quality of care. 
Under FFS providers may deliver additional services whether or not they are medically 
necessary, but under the budget payment system seen frequently in tax-financed systems 
providers are likely to end up under-serving patients (Ellis and Miller 2008). The US evidence on 
the impact of competition on quality is mixed; however, the evidence from the UK which started 
encouraging public hospitals to compete with one another for contracts with tax-financed public 
payers, suggests that quality may have been adversely affected by competition (Propper et al. 
2004; Propper et al. 2008). In any case, this is a moot point, given that neither SHI nor tax-
financed systems have historically relied upon competition between providers.  
2.4  SHI vs. tax-finance vis-à-vis labor market outcomes  
Overall, then, the likely impacts on health outcomes of the choice between SHI and tax-
financed systems is unclear a priori. By contrast, the impact of the choice on labor market 
outcomes is somewhat clearer. SHI contributions are in effect a payroll tax and hence, according 
to the textbook treatment of payroll taxes, are likely to reduce employment levels and encourage 
informal employment. This argument begs, however, the question of what the labor market 
effects would be of whatever taxes were used instead of a payroll tax. As far as employment is 
concerned, it has been argued that, at least in the OECD countries, payroll, income and   13
consumption taxes all have broadly similar effects on employment (cf. Nickell 2004; Nickell et 
al. 2005).  
On the other hand, SHI can provide a disincentive for people to join and stay in formal 
employment, while the same is not true of general revenue-financing (cf. e.g. Belev 2003; Baeza 
and Packard 2006; Datta 2006; Levy 2007). The incentive is likely to be especially large in the 
case where among informal sector workers SHI enrollment is voluntary (as in Germany) or is 
only weakly enforced (more likely to be the case in countries like Mexico and Turkey). In such a 
setting, people can rely on private insurance (in some countries they are required by law to have 
it if they do not join the SHI scheme), or they may opt for informal employment arrangements 
and resort to using the health ministry’s public health care system, albeit facing higher out-of-
pocket payments than they would have done under the SHI system and probably ending up with 
worse quality care. These incentives become even more of an issue if being in formal 
employment means being drawn into the tax system and having to contribute to a pension 
scheme that because of limited life expectancy may only pay out for a few years if any.  
3.  Methods 
The methods used are the same as those used by WMS (2008a; 2008b) to which the 
reader is referred for more detail. Let yit be the outcome of interest in country i at time t, SHIit be 
a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if country i has a SHI health financing system at time t, 
and X it be a vector of covariates thought to potentially influence both outcomes and the SHI 
adoption decision. The basic model takes the form:  
(1)  it it it it e SHI X y + + = δ γ ,    14
where the eit capture unobservable variables and statistical noise. The interest is in the coefficient 
δ which gives the impact of SHI on yit. If SHIit and eit are correlated (i.e. SHI status is 
endogenous), estimation of eqn (1) by pooled OLS would result in a biased estimate of δ. It 
could be that countries with unobserved characteristics that led to higher-than-expected levels of, 
say, self-employment may deliberately choose not to adopt SHI because of the difficulty of 
having a contribution-based financing system with large numbers of self-employed. Or it might 
be that certain changes or events occurred broadly around the same time that SHI was 
introduced; if we do not capture these in our model but instead implicitly include them in eit, and 
if they affect the outcomes of interest, our estimate of δ will be biased.  
3.1   Difference-in-differences models  
The simplest way to allow for such a correlation is to let:  
(2)  it t i it e ε θ α + + = ,  
where  θt is a period-specific intercept, αi is a country-specific effect which captures time-
invariant unobservables that are potentially correlated with SHI status, and εit is an idiosyncratic 
error term (iid over i and t). Substituting eqn (2) in eqn (1), and taking first-differences, gives:  
(3)  it t it it it SHI X y ε ξ δ γ Δ + + Δ + Δ = Δ .  
In the special case where the Xit are omitted, eqn (3) is the standard difference-in-differences 
(DID) estimator (cf. e.g. Wooldridge 2002 p.284).
7  
Eqn (3) assumes a parallel or common trend: the θ t do not depend on the value of SHIit, 
and therefore the health systems that switch from tax-finance to SHI or vice versa and those that 
                                                 
7 Standard errors need to be adjusted for clustering at the country level to allow for serial correlation (cf. Bertrand et 
al. 2004; Cameron and Trivedi 2005 p.705).   15
do not switch exhibit the same trend. A model that allows this parallel trend assumption (PTA) to 
be relaxed is the ‘random trend’ (RT) model (cf. e.g. Wooldridge 2002 p.316). Eqn (2) is 
replaced by the assumption  
(4)  it i t i it t k e ε θ α + + + = .  
This allows for the possibility that different countries have different trends, as reflected in 
different values of ki. Substituting eqn (4) in eqn (1), and taking first differences, gives: 
(5)  it i t it it it k SHI X y ε ξ δ γ Δ + + + Δ + Δ = Δ , 
which can be estimated using a fixed effects estimator. If the ki are jointly insignificant, eqn (5) 
collapses to eqn (3), which would provide some evidence in support of the PTA. Yet even if the 
ki were jointly significant, the PTA would still be a reasonable assumption if the ki are 
uncorrelated with SHIit; this can be tested via a generalized Hausman test (cf. Wooldridge 2002 
p.290).
8  
The RT model, while less restrictive than the DID estimator, assumes the trend in 
unobservables is linear, and that the trend is specific to the country and is not modified by a 
switch from tax-finance to SHI or vice versa. Another model that allows the PTA to be relaxed is 
the ‘differential trend’ (DT) model of Bell et al. (1999). They assume: 
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8 This can be implemented by estimating an augmented version of eqn  ) using a random effects estimator—adding 
the within-country panel means of the original covariates which vary over i and t as regressors, and testing the null 
hypothesis of insignificance of the additional SHI term (with cluster-robust standard errors). Non-rejection of this 
hypothesis would suggest that the ki are uncorrelated with SHIit. 
(5  16
where mt is an unobserved trend, the influence of which on yit is allowed to differ between SHI 
and non-SHI systems. Incorporating this assumption into eqn (1), and taking first differences, 
gives:  
(7)  ( ) ( ) it it t n s t n it it it SHI m k k m k SHI X y ε δ γ Δ + Δ − + Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ . 
To estimate eqn (7), the Δmt are replaced by first differences of year dummies and the Δ(mtSHIit) 
are replaced by first differences of interactions between year dummies and the SHI status 
dummy. The estimating equation is thus:  
(8)  ( ) it it
T T
it it it SHI YEAR YEAR SHI X y ε ϕ β δ γ τ τ τ τ τ τ Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ ∑ ∑ = = 2 2 , 
which can be estimated by pooled OLS. In this model the impact of SHI varies over time, but 
one can estimate the average impact of SHI over time: 
(9)  ∑ = − + =
T
T IMPACT SHI MEAN
2 1 ˆ ˆ
τ τ ϕ δ . 
The PTA assumption in this model implies ks=kn. This can be tested indirectly by testing the 
nonlinear restriction:  
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3.2   Testing for and dealing with reverse causality  
Although the DID, RT and DT models all allow for some correlation between SHI and 
the original error term eit, they entail specific assumptions that may not adequately capture the 
endogeneity of SHI. Like WMS, the analysis below uses the test of reverse causality proposed by 
Gruber and Hanratty (1995). In each of the three models, a lead dummy variable is included   17
indicating whether SHI will be adopted the following year. If causality goes from SHI to the 
outcome variable, the coefficient on the lead dummy will be zero. A nonzero coefficient would 
point towards causality running the other way or some other type of endogeneity that cannot be 
captured by the model in question.  
For outcomes where none of the three models above is able to address the endogeneity of 
SHIit, estimation is undertaken using instrumental variables (IV), using lags of the potentially 
endogenous SHI variable as instruments, as well as “traditional” instruments. If these 
instruments are valid (i.e. exogenous and strong in the sense of being highly correlated with the 
instrumented SHI dummy—assumptions which can be tested), they should control for any kind 
of endogeneity in eqn (1), including that arising from country-specific effects and trends. Eqn (1) 
can thus be consistently estimated by two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) or using the more 
efficient two-step generalized method-of-moments (IV-GMM) estimator (cf. e.g. Cameron and 
Trivedi 2005). 
The first lag of the SHI dummy (SHIi,t-1) is used as an instrument
9, along with two other 
time-invariant variables: a dummy indicating whether the country was a World War II Axis 
member (Germany, Italy and Japan) or occupied by one or more of the Axis power
10; and a 
dummy indicating whether the country is an English-speaking country. Many SHI countries had 
a fledgling SHI system in place prior to World War II, but Germany was quick to mould the 
health systems of the countries it occupied to conform to the Bismarkian SHI model, and many 
                                                 
9 Although under weak exogeneity one could theoretically use more lags of the SHI variable as instruments, only the 
first lag is included due to the lack of variation over time in our SHI dummy (transitions between tax-funded health 
and SHI systems occur only once, if at all, in our sample), leading to the redundancy of additional lags and loss of 
degrees of freedom for overidentifying restrictions tests. 
10 Countries with a value of 1 for the Axis dummy are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland.    18
countries left the system largely intact after 1945. Japan occupied Korea between 1910 and 1945, 
and while it was not until the early 1960s that SHI began to take off in Korea, the influence of 
Japan’s system is much in evidence (Anderson 1989; Bong-Min 1996). By contrast, political 
leaders in the English-speaking countries pushed for tax-finance early after World War II, though 
universal tax-financed health care did not immediately become a reality except in the UK where 
it was adopted in 1948. The relevance of the three instruments is assessed through LM and Wald 
versions of under-identification and weak identification tests based on the rk statistic recently 
proposed by Kleibergen and Paap (2006) which account for non-iid structures of the error terms 
in the estimated equations. Cluster-robust versions of Hansen’s J-statistic tests are used to check 
the exogeneity of the instruments in the estimated models.  
4.  Data  
The empirical analysis uses a SHI indicator constructed from various sources, and annual 
data from OECD Health Data for the period 1960-2003.
11  
4.1   Social health insurance status 
SHIit is defined as taking a value of one if in country i at time t if the cell in Figure 1 is 
shaded gray. The SHI status dummy is equal to 1 in about half (716 observations) of the 1,363 
country-year combinations for which there are non-missing values of the indicator. 
For the most part, the classifications in Figure 1 are innocuous. However, there are some 
ambiguities worth mentioning. In group (i), there are several ambiguities. Germany was two 
countries from 1945-89, and operated two different health systems; no allowance is made for this 
                                                 
11 The GDP deflator was taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.    19
fact. Strictly, Korea began SHI only in 1963, but it was a largely out-of-pocket system before 
then, and coding it a tax-financed system before 1963 would likely be a bigger error. Mexico and 
Turkey began setting up a SHI system in the 1940s, but universal coverage has yet to be 
achieved in either country; nonetheless, both countries manifestly aspire to be fully-fledged SHI 
systems. In group (ii), there are no coding ambiguities. Nor are there any in group (iii)—all are 
countries that had a fledgling SHI system in place but abandoned it in favor of universal tax-
financed health care. In group (iv), the only ambiguity is Poland, which reverted to SHI, having 
had a fledgling SHI system before World War II, but levies a dedicated income tax on everyone 
to finance it rather than an earnings-related payroll tax on formal sector workers. The results 
presented below are based on Poland being coded a SHI country from 1998 onwards; the results 
are similar if Poland is coded a tax-financed country throughout the period.  
4.2   Outcome variables  
The dependent variables include total health expenditure (THE) per capita, potential 
years of life lost (PYLL) for nine ‘amenable’ causes of death, employment as a share of the 
population of working age, and the share of people employed who are paid a salary or a wage.  
THE per capita is converted at purchasing power parities (PPP) and expressed in real 
terms using the country’s GDP deflator. PYLL indicate the number of years of life (up to the age 
of 70) that are lost as the result of a death. They are calculated by summing up deaths occurring 
at each age and multiplying this by the number of remaining years to live up to the selected age 
limit of 70. To improve comparability over time and across countries, the OECD Health Data 
PYLL calculations are age-standardized to a reference population. The nine ‘amenable’ causes 
selected for the analysis below are the nine causes that appear both in the OECD Health Data and   20
Nolte and McKee’s (2008) list of amenable causes. These are: malignant neoplasms of the colon 
and rectum (ICD10 C18-21); malignant neoplasm of the breast (females only) (C50); malignant 
neoplasm of the cervix uteri (females only) (C53); diabetes (E10-4); ischemic heart disease 
(ICD10-I20-5); cerebrovascular disease (I60-9); influenza and pneumonia (J10-28); maternal 
death (O00-99); and perinatal deaths other than stillbirths (P00-96).
12  
Employment includes formal-sector workers (employees paid a wage or salary) as well as 
the self-employed. The variable is defined as employment as a percentage of the population aged 
15-65. The formal-sector employment variable is defined as the number of people with a salaried 
or waged job, expressed as a fraction of the number of people in employment.  
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. Health spending per capita is higher in SHI 
country-year combinations than in tax-financed country-year combinations. SHI country-year 
combinations have higher PYLL for six of the nine amenable causes of death, and have lower 
rates of formal sector employment and employment. These are, of course, simple bivariate 
comparisons, and tell us nothing about the causal effect of SHI on these outcomes.  
4.3   Covariates in the estimating equation 
As in WMS (2008b), the only covariate included is GDP per capita. There is some 
evidence that in central and eastern Europe and central Asia SHI schemes emerged first in 
countries with higher initial (i.e. pre-transition) per capita income levels, whilst tax-based 
funding prevailed in countries with lower initial per capita income (Preker et al. 2002).  
                                                 
12 Nolte and McKee (2008) argue that only half of ischemic heart disease deaths below the age of 74 are avoidable, 
and use an upper limit of 49 for diabetes. The OECD Health Data PYLL use an age limit of 70 for all ICD codes, so 
there is nothing that can be done about the latter. In both cases, we might expect that the choice of health system will 
matter less for these two causes of death than for other causes.    21
The exclusion of other possible covariates means that the results will capture the overall 
effects of SHI, holding constant only per capita income. One could include, in addition to per 
capita income, variables capturing the fraction of the population covered by insurance, the 
provider payment mechanism in force, whether or not there is a GP gatekeeper, and so on. But 
these are all features of the health system that are associated with whether the system is SHI or 
tax-financed. If these were included, the coefficient on SHI would be interpreted as the effect of 
SHI holding these other institutional features constant. The specification used in the present 
study, by contrast, sheds light on the overall effects of SHI, without shedding light on the 
channels by which the choice between SHI and tax finance makes a difference, if indeed it does.  
Of course, whether or not the coefficient on SHI can be so interpreted depends on the 
specification not excluding other factors that are associated with the adoption of SHI or tax 
finance and the outcomes of interest. Were eqn (1) to be estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS), the case for interpreting δ as the impact of SHI would clearly be weak. But the use of the 
various generalizations of differences-in-differences and IV makes the case much stronger, 
especially as tests are reported that shed light on the validity of the assumptions underlying the 
various models. The results ought, therefore, to be consistent with a correlation between eit and 
SHIit in eqn (1) caused by omitted relevant variables being lumped into the error term.  
5.  Results 
This section presents first the results of the specification tests, and then the estimates of 
the impacts of SHI.    22
5.1   Specification tests 
Table 3 reports the results of the reverse causality tests. For the per capita health spending 
variable, and most PYLL variables, there is no evidence that the DID, random trend and 
differential trend models fail to account adequately for any correlation between eit and SHIit in 
eqn (1). The exceptions are the ischemic heart disease PYLL variable, where the coefficient on 
the lead value of SHIit is significant at the 5% level in all three models, and cerebrovascular 
disease, where the coefficient on SHIit+1 is significant at the 10% level in the random trend model 
and almost so in the basic DID model. In the case of the formal sector share labor market 
outcome, there is evidence that the three generalized differences-in-differences models fails 
adequately to take into account the correlation between SHIit and the error term in eqn (1). This 
is not an unexpected result, given that SHI hinges on formal-sector contributions; it is less easy 
to rationalize why there appears to be reverse causality in the cases of ischemic and 
cerebrovascular disease but not in the cases of other diseases.  
Table 4 reports the results of the parallel-trend assumption (PTA) tests for the random-
trend and differential-trend models, i.e. eqns (5) and (8). The only two relevant outcomes where 
the PTA is rejected are the influenza and pneumonia PYLL variable, and the pregnancy PYLL 
variable. In the former, the PTA is rejected (at the 10% level only) in favor of the random trend 
model but not in favor of the differential trend model, while in the case of the latter the PTA is 
rejected (at the 1% level) in favor of the differential trend model but not in favor of the random 
trend model.  
Table 6 shows the relevant IV diagnostic test statistics for all the outcomes, though the 
interest lies with ischemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, and the formal-sector share of   23
employment variables, for which IV is the preferred estimator. The three instruments are highly 
relevant for all outcomes, with high partial F statistics (not shown in Table 6). Kleibergen-Paap 
LM and Wald tests also strongly reject the null hypotheses of model under-identification and 
weak instruments respectively (Stock and Yogo 2002). The results of the Hansen tests for over-
identifying restrictions, by contrast, are mixed. In the case of five outcomes, the null hypothesis 
of over-identification is rejected at the 10% level or lower, casting doubt on the validity of the 
instruments for these outcomes. In only one of these cases, however, is IV the indicated 
estimation strategy on the basis of the reverse causality tests, namely ischemic heart disease; for 
this variable, therefore, there are no reliable estimates of the impact of SHI. In the case of 
cerebrovascular disease, the over-identification restrictions are not rejected, but the rejection is 
not as decisive as one might like. By contrast, the Hansen test results suggest the over-
identifying restrictions are valid in the case of both labor market outcomes, one of which failed 
the endogeneity test with all three DID models.  
5.2   Estimates of SHI impacts  
Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates (and associated p-value for the null hypothesis of 
a zero SHI impact) for the DID models and Table 6 the IV estimates.
13  
In the case of health spending per capita, the simplest model consistent with the data is 
the basic DID model, i.e. eqn (3). This suggests that SHI raises total health spending per capita 
by 3.5%; the estimated impact is significant at the 1% level. The random trend model gives a 
similar result, as does the differential trend model, though the effect is not significant in the 
latter.  
                                                 
13 The models are estimated using the natural logarithm of the dependent variable.   24
Turning to the estimates of SHI on potential years of life lost from amenable mortality, 
the preferred model for colon cancer is also the basic DID model; there is no sign in this model 
(or any other) of SHI having a significant effect. The same is not true, however, of breast cancer, 
where the preferred model is again the DID model: this model and the random trend model 
suggest that SHI raises mortality by 5-6%, though in both models the effect is significant at the 
10% level but not at the 5% level. No effect is found for either cervical cancer or diabetes; the 
DID model is the preferred model in both cases. In the case of ischemic heart disease, there is, as 
already mentioned, no set of estimates that passes the relevant diagnostic tests. In the case of 
cerebrovascular disease, the preferred estimates are the IV estimates. However, the hypothesis of 
invalid over-identification restrictions is not decisively rejected, and in any case the lead SHI 
dummy test of exogeneity is not decisively rejected. The fact that the DID and IV estimates in 
this case give rather different results is therefore a cause for concern: neither suggest a 
significant impact at the 5% level, but the estimates are of opposite sign, and the IV results point 
to a positive impact of SHI that is significant at the 10% level. This result should be probably 
interpreted with caution. In the case of influenza and pneumonia, there is some ambiguity about 
the validity of the PTA assumption; in the event, none of the estimates is anywhere near being 
significant. The differential trend model is the preferred model in the case of pregnancy, but the 
estimated impact of SHI is not significant. Finally, in the case of the perinatal causes PYLL 
variable, the basic DID model is the preferred model; once again, there is no evidence of any 
impact of SHI.   
Turning to the labor market outcomes, the preferred model in the case of the variable 
capturing the formal sector share of employment is the IV model, which, in this case, passes all 
the diagnostic tests decisively. The estimates suggest that SHI reduces the formal sector share of   25
employment by 8-10%; the estimated effects are significant at the 1% level. The results on the 
employment level are less clear-cut. The simplest model consistent with the data is the basic DID 
model which suggests a small and insignificant negative effect. However, the IV estimates pass 
the various diagnostic tests decisively, and therefore can be considered legitimate estimates: they 
suggest a significant negative effect of SHI on employment of the order of 5-6%, but only the 
GMM estimate is significant and even then only at the 10% level.  
6.  Summary and discussion  
The transitions between SHI and tax finance that have occurred in the OECD countries 
since 1960 provide an opportunity to assess the systemwide impacts of adopting SHI in 
preference to a tax-financed health system. While reforms during the 1990s and 2000s have left 
the distinction between the two models increasingly blurred, the two systems have—and for the 
most part continue to have—certain distinctive hallmarks. SHI systems provide coverage in 
exchange for earnings-related contributions levied largely on formal-sector workers; tax-
financed systems, by contrast, rely on general government tax (and nontax) revenues. Gaps in 
coverage are commonplace in SHI systems, and traditionally differences have existed in benefit 
packages and expenditures per enrollee. SHI systems rarely have a GP acting as a gatekeeper to 
second-level providers, while tax-financed systems almost always do; the latter traditionally 
have, as a result, put greater emphasis on primary care. OECD SHI systems mostly do not 
directly manage their own provider network, but instead contract with providers—often public 
and private sector ones; fee-for-service (FFS) has been the commonest payment method, though 
this is changing.    26
The questions asked by this paper are whether, on balance, having a SHI system rather 
than a tax-financed system results in higher or lower health spending per capita, and whether 
having one system or the other (not holding health spending constant) results in better or worse 
outcomes with regard to amenable mortality, higher or lower levels of employment, and a higher 
or lower share of formal-sector workers in total employment. Econometric models are estimated 
on panel data from 29 OECD countries over the period 1960-2006. Particular attention is paid to 
the likelihood that whether a country has a SHI or tax-financed system in place at a particular 
moment in time may be correlated with excluded and potentially unobservable variables that also 
affect the outcomes of interest, i.e. SHI status may be endogenous. The models estimated include 
a generalized differences-in-differences model, a random trend model, and a differential trend 
model: the first assumes unobservables remain constant over time; the second allows them to 
change over time but linearly, albeit at a different rate in each country; the third allows them to 
grow nonlinearly, but at the same rate in all countries within a given health system group. The 
parallel trends assumption implicit in the first model is tested in the second two models. Where 
these assumptions fail adequately to capture the endogeneity of SHI status, as reflected in a 
significant coefficient on SHI status one year in the future, instrumental variables (IV) are used, 
and diagnostic tests are undertaken to assess the validity of the identifying restrictions.  
The results are clear-cut on two questions: SHI raises per capita total health spending by 
3-4%, and reduces the formal-sector share of employment by 8-10%. With regard to health 
outcomes, there is absolutely no evidence in the results that SHI systems achieve lower rates of 
amenable mortality. In fact, the evidence suggests that with regard to premature mortality from 
breast cancer among women, SHI systems perform worse, with 5-6% higher potential years of 
life lost (PYLL). The lack of positive health impacts in favor of SHI systems is despite their 3-  27
4% higher health spending per capita. With regard to employment levels overall, the IV results 
are consistent with SHI reducing total employment as a share of the working-age population by 
5-6%, though the differences-in-differences estimates which are also valid point to a smaller (and 
insignificant) impact.  
The results are similar (though somewhat smaller in magnitude) to those of Wagstaff and 
Moreno-Serra (WMS) (2008a; 2008b) who employ similar methods to look at the impacts of SHI 
transitions among a group of 28 (mostly different) countries in central and eastern Europe and 
central Asia over the period 1990-2003. They too found that SHI raised health spending per 
capita (by 11% in their comparable model), increased self-employment (by 17%), and reduced 
total employment as a share of the working-age population (by 10%). WMS, however, found no 
significant impacts in either direction on health status indicators; it is worth noting, though, that 
many of their cause-specific mortality indicators are not ones that are considered amenable to 
medical care, and their indicators reflected deaths among all age groups not just those among age 
groups where mortality is considered amenable to medical care.  
The findings in this paper (and in WMS) with regard to SHI increasing health spending 
are not new, but rather provide reassurance that the often-noted higher spending levels in SHI 
countries in a typical cross-section reflects causality and is not a spurious association. The 
finding in this paper and in WMS with regard to the size (in employment terms) of the formal 
sector is novel, but is consistent with speculation by previous authors. The results in the two 
papers suggest that policymakers should take seriously the suggestion (cf. e.g. Baeza and 
Packard 2006) that SHI may encourage informality in labor markets.    28
The results in this paper concerning the impacts of SHI on health outcomes suggest that 
the WMS conclusions (SHI countries spend more but do not achieve better health outcomes) 
need to be nuanced slightly. The estimates reported in this paper suggest that SHI systems may 
actually achieve worse outcomes with respect to at least one cause of premature death that is 
amenable to medical care, namely breast cancer. This finding is not implausible. Coleman et al. 
(2008) have noted that reducing mortality from breast cancer (and other cancers, including 
cancer of the colon) requires the efficient implementation of organized, population-based 
screening programs which can provide detection and diagnosis at an early stage of disease (p.4), 
while Allin et al. (2004) concluded that “countries with SHI models of funding have less 
comprehensive national public health activities than those with tax-funded systems” (p.18). This, 
they note, reflects a different historical focus, with SHI systems focusing on individual members 
of insurance schemes and tax-financed systems focusing more broadly on the entire population. 
As a result, public health programs—including screening—tend in tax-financed systems to be 
part of a population-wide integrated program, while in SHI countries they are often a set of 
disjointed activities undertaken by several often poorly coordinated health system “actors”.
14 
The finding that SHI systems perform worse on rates of amenable mortality where strong 
population-based public health programs are required is consistent with the Arbelaez et al.’s 
(2004) finding that the introduction of managed competition in Colombia’s SHI system led to 
fragmentation of responsibilities and discontinuity in the prevention and treatment of 
tuberculosis.  
                                                 
14 In some SHI countries, many public health programs are undertaken by the public health authorities, and hence 
beyond the relationship between sickness funds and providers. In others, at least some public health activities are 
undertaken within this relationship, funded by sickness funds, delivered by private physicians, and overseen by 
public health authorities. Germany adopts this model for screening, but not altogether successfully according to 
Allin et al. In still other countries, public health activities are provided by other organizational structures that bring 
together sickness funds, providers, public health authorities and others. This is how the Netherlands organizes its 
cancer screening program. Whichever of the three approaches is used, the degree of coordination and integration 
seems bound to be less than it would be in an efficiently organized population-oriented tax-financed system.   29
The results of this paper suggest, then, that SHI systems, on balance, have certain 
characteristics that make them more expensive than tax-financed systems, do no better in terms 
of most health outcomes that are amenable to medical care despite the extra spending, may do 
worse in respect of outcomes that require strong population-level public health programs, and do 
worse in terms of encouraging informal labor markets and discouraging employment. It is, of 
course, possible that not all of the attributes of SHI systems pull in the same direction. SHI 
advocates might argue, for example, that its typically favored purchaser-provider split model 
where purchaser organizations contract with providers rather than manage them directly can lead 
to lower expenditures and better health outcomes. This could be true, and the results above are 
consistent with it being true. But they are also consistent with it not being true. And even if it 
were true, the question arises: How far policymakers can choose the good elements from one 
health system model without getting the bad ones? A SHI system can easily increase its reliance 
on tax revenues, as several have recently done. But can a tax-financed system with a directly 
managed provider network shift to a purchaser-provider-contracting  model without risking 
coherence and integration in its public health programs? Questions such as these will doubtless 
occupy much of the future debate on health system design, and the SHI and tax-financed systems 
of the rich OECD countries will probably continue to borrow ideas from one another, making 
broad-brush studies such as this will less useful than studies that allow the pros and cons of 
specific aspects of each type of system to be determined. For the developing world, however, and 
for countries considering a wholesale switch between SHI and tax finance, broad-brush studies 
like this will continue to be helpful in deciding whether, on balance, SHI systems or tax-financed 
systems spend more, achieve better health, and lead to better labor market outcomes.  
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Figure 1: SHI systems in the OECD, 1960-2006 
 
 
Sources: WHO Health in Transition series (HiTS) http://www.euro.who.int/observatory/Hits/TopPage, Saltman and 
Dubois (2004), Carrin and James (2005).  
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Primary care providers  Hospitals Gatekeeper 
Austria  SHI  Capitation + FFS   DRGs + FFS (outpatient)  No 
Belgium  SHI  FFS   Budgets + FFS   No 
Czech Republic  SHI  Capitation + FFS (previously FFS)  Budgets (previously FFS)  No 
France  SHI  Capitation + FFS   Global budgets  No 
Germany  SHI  Capitation   DRGs  No  
Greece  SHI  FFS  Per diems   No  
Hungary SHI  Capitation    DRGs  No 
Japan  SHI  FFS FFS No 
Korea  SHI  FFS FFS No 
Luxembourg  SHI  FFS   Global budgets  No 
Mexico SHI  Budgets    Budgets  No 
Netherlands SHI  Capitation    DRGs  Yes 
Poland SHI  Capitation    DRGs  No 
Slovak Republic  SHI  Capitation + FFS (previously FFS)  Budgets (previously FFS)  Partial  
Switzerland  SHI  FFS   Global budgets + per diems  No 
Turkey  SHI  Salary  Global budgets + variations   No 
Australia  Tax  FFS  Global budgets   Yes 
Canada  Tax  FFS  Global budgets  Yes  
Denmark  Tax  Capitation + FFS   Global budgets  Yes 
Finland Tax  Salary,  capitation + FFS   FFS  No  
Iceland  Tax  Salary   Global budgets  No 
Ireland  Tax  Capitation   Global budgets  Yes  
Italy  Tax  Capitation + FFS   DRGs  Yes 
New Zealand  Tax  Capitation + FFS   Global budgets  Yes 
Norway  Tax  Salary, capitation + FFS   DRGs  Yes 
Portugal Tax  Budgets  Global  budgets  Yes 
Spain Tax  Salary  DRGs  Yes 
Sweden  Tax  Salary  Global budgets + variations   Yes 
United Kingdom  Tax  Capitation + allowances + FFS   DRGs (previously budgets)  Yes  
Sources: WHO Health in Transition series (HiTS) http://www.euro.who.int/observatory/Hits/TopPage and others.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 
    Full sample  SHI = 1    SHI = 0 
    Mean SD Obs  Mean SD  Obs    Mean SD  Obs 
Tot. health exp. per capita    174.30 166.46 872  235.87 210.91 409  119.92 81.45 463
PYLL cancer of colon    93.85 32.70 1158  87.77 29.32 594 100.24  34.82 564
PYLL breast cancer    224.61 67.76 1158  207.79 73.50 594 242.33  55.97 564
PYLL cervical cancer     60.20 42.27 1158  63.50 49.86 594  56.72  32.09 564
PYLL diabetes    56.60 46.59 1162  64.99 61.25 598  47.70  18.51 564
PYLL ischemic heart disease    527.32 291.84 1162  423.92 211.29 598  636.95  323.89 564
PYLL cerebrovascular disease   243.25 132.84 1162  257.21 141.66 598  228.46  121.17 564
PYLL influenza pneumonia    229.75 366.43 1162  302.81 472.14 598  152.28  169.80 564
PYLL pregnancy     29.33 54.45 1154  41.40 70.74 597  16.39  21.46 557
PYLL perinatal causes    746.39 623.71 1162  862.32 687.16 598  623.48  521.64 564
Formal sector employment    0.77 0.13 1112  0.74 0.14 575  0.81  0.09 537
Employment     0.66 0.08 1163  0.65 0.08 620  0.67  0.08 543
 
Note: Health expenditure per capita is at 1960 prices and converted at PPP.  PYLL are expressed per 100 000 
population. Formal sector employment is as a share of total employment. Employment is as a share of the population 









model    
Random trend  
model    
Differential trend  
model 
 
Lead SHI dummy test 
on eqn (3)      
Lead SHI dummy 
test on eqn (5)    
Lead SHI dummy 
test on eqn (8) 
Dependent variable  Coef  p-value        Coef  p-value        Coef  p-value 
Tot. health exp. per capita  -0.007  0.641      -0.001  0.953      -0.012  0.572 
PYLL cancer of colon  -0.076  0.198      -0.073  0.198      -0.075  0.279 
PYLL breast cancer  -0.084  0.189      -0.081  0.206      -0.094  0.167 
PYLL cervical cancer   -0.032  0.782      -0.026  0.822      -0.039  0.736 
PYLL  diabetes  0.052  0.253    0.058  0.316    0.046  0.381 
PYLL ischemic heart disease  -0.031  0.003      -0.027  0.014      -0.031  0.003 
PYLL  cerebrovascular  disease 0.079  0.102    0.081  0.085    0.075  0.137 
PYLL influenza pneumonia  -0.060  0.212      -0.068  0.128      -0.069  0.205 
PYLL pregnancy   0.037  0.774      0.024  0.853      0.047  0.740 
PYLL perinatal causes  0.007  0.909      0.005  0.944      -0.013  0.869 
Formal  sector  employment  -0.011  0.004     -0.009  0.014    -0.011  0.001 
Employment    -0.002  0.780     -0.002  0.757    -0.001  0.821 
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Table 4: Tests of the parallel trend assumption  
 
  Random trend model      Differential trend model   
 
Generalized Hausman  
test on eqn (5)      
Non-linear restriction  
test on eqn (10)   
Dependent variable  chi-square  p-value        F  p-value    
Tot. health exp. per capita  2.450  0.118      0.290  0.595   
PYLL cancer of colon  0.720  0.395      1.280  0.270   
PYLL breast cancer  0.790  0.375      1.350  0.257   
PYLL cervical cancer   0.570  0.450      0.060  0.809   
PYLL diabetes  0.000  0.966      0.090  0.771   
PYLL ischemic heart disease  1.090 0.296      0.650 0.428   
PYLL cerebrovascular disease  0.190  0.664      0.470  0.501   
PYLL influenza pneumonia  3.720  0.054      0.170  0.683   
PYLL pregnancy   2.360  0.125      8.220  0.009   
PYLL perinatal causes  2.170  0.141        0.120  0.728    
Formal sector employment  3.170 0.075      5.550 0.028   
Employment   1.130  0.289      0.100  0.756   
 
Note: Italicized numbers indicate estimates that are to be ignored because diagnostic tests have shown them to be 
irrelevant or unreliable.  
 
 




model    
Random trend  
model    
Differential trend  
model 
Dependent variable  Coef  p-value        Coef  p-value        Coef  p-value 
Tot. health exp. per capita  0.035  0.001      0.040  0.001      0.037  0.261 
PYLL cancer of colon  -0.034  0.412      -0.029  0.468      -0.037  0.525 
PYLL breast cancer  0.055  0.095      0.059  0.082      0.065  0.245 
PYLL cervical cancer   0.020  0.805      0.027  0.738      0.005  0.949 
PYLL  diabetes  0.000  0.996    0.007  0.927    -0.118  0.376 
PYLL ischemic heart disease  0.009  0.760    0.013  0.635    0.131  0.139 
PYLL  cerebrovascular  disease  -0.125  0.175     -0.124  0.187    -0.065  0.125 
PYLL influenza pneumonia  0.075  0.339      0.068  0.403      0.050  0.619 
PYLL pregnancy   -0.031  0.767      -0.043  0.690      -0.135  0.361 
PYLL perinatal causes  0.012  0.599      0.010  0.690      0.098  0.396 
Formal sector employment  0.000  0.944    0.002  0.699    0.006  0.788 
Employment    -0.003  0.407     -0.003  0.370    0.025  0.153 
 
Notes: In all models, the natural logarithm of the dependent variable is used. Italicized numbers indicate estimates 
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Table 6: IV estimates of SHI effects on health and labor outcomes 
 
 
 2SLS    GMM         
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  KP LM  KP Wald  Hansen J 
Tot. health exp. per capita  -0.154 0.05 -0.167 0.02  0.00  12363  0.044 
PYLL cancer of colon  -0.179 0.08 -0.111 0.24  0.00  11004  0.034 
PYLL breast cancer  -0.263  0.06  -0.217  0.06  0.00  11004  0.188 
PYLL cervical cancer   -0.059  0.72  -0.067  0.65  0.00  10938  0.179 
PYLL  diabetes  0.235 0.15 0.226 0.15  0.00  10999  0.904 
PYLL ischemic heart disease  -0.489 0.01 -0.551 0.00  0.00  11119  0.076 
PYLL  cerebrovascular  disease  0.245 0.06 0.216 0.07  0.00  11119  0.220 
PYLL influenza pneumonia  0.504 0.08 0.511 0.06  0.00  11119  0.021 
PYLL pregnancy   0.953 0.00 0.944 0.00  0.00  11797  0.010 
PYLL perinatal causes  0.285 0.21 0.286 0.16  0.00  11119  0.059 
Formal sector employment  -0.097  0.01  -0.084  0.01  0.00  8353  0.492 
Employment   -0.053  0.14  -0.060  0.08  0.00  8298  0.413 
 
Notes: Italicized numbers indicate estimates that are to be ignored because diagnostic tests have shown them to be 
irrelevant or unreliable. The reported IV point estimates are from 2SLS estimation, where the excluded 
instruments are the first lag of the SHI dummy, whether the country was a World War II Axis member or 
occupied by one or more of the Axis power, and a dummy indicating whether the country is an English-speaking 
country. P-values are reported for the Kleibergen-Paap LM and Hansen tests, whereas the values reported for the 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald tests of weak identification correspond to the estimated rk Wald F statistics; in our case, 
the critical value for the weak identification tests (tabulated by Stock and Yogo 2002, 10% maximal IV size) is 
22.30. In the last column, the joint null hypothesis of the over-identification tests is that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the main equation.  
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